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SYMBOLIC POLITICS AND CULTURAL HISTORY
ANTHONY ASHBOLT

Transcript of an interview with Professor Michael Paul Ragin, Robson Professor of
Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, conducted in the Cafe Grace,
Berkeley, November 1, 1995. *

AA: I want, first of all, to take you back to your book on McCarthy and to the
co-authored book about political change in California. It seems to me
that both these books have a direct relevance today. For instance, in the
McCarthy study you argue that far from being a mass phenomenon in
the populist tradition, McCarthyism was elite manipulated politics. Isn't
that also true of the new right today? While pretending to be popularly
based the new right is basically an elite (or ruling class) fraction acting
in its own interests. So are we seeing history repeat itself?
MR: No, not really because you are dealing with two quite distinct historical
moments. There are certain continuities - a lot of people who were
McCarthyites are very happy about the new right, especially certain
political intellectuals like Pat Buchanan. If you look at Irving Kristol
being a kind of apologist for McCarthy and his son William Kristol as
part of the cultural elite of the new right, you can see the continuities.
There is a history of demonizing in American politics, yet the forms of
demonizing linked to McCarthy, on the one hand, and the new right, on
the other, are very different. The new right arose in the wake of
significant social and cultural disturbance which did generate
widespread anxiety - civil rights campaigns, the rise of feminism, youth
rebellion, grave concern over religion. These sorts of issues weren't on
the table with McCarthyism. And then, perhaps even more
fundamentally, there is the economic stagnation in the 1970s
(sometimes understood as a shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist
economy) at the expense of the American working and middle classes.
So there is now an anxiety throughout the American populace which
simply wasn't the case with McCarthyism. McCarthyism, I argued and
continue to argue, was an elite phenomenon that had to do with the
Cold War, with anxiety over Communism. That remained fundamentally
at the elite level and it really only mattered in wider American politics
during the Korean War. Many of the analyses of McCarthyism which
deal with it in terms of generalized cultural anxieties are quite wrong
because the Fifties was not a period of the politicization of those
anxieties.
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It is certainly true that there is an elite component to the new right.
Take the defense industry. If you look at the Contract On America, it
includes massive increases in defense spending which are entirely
delusional at this time. It also includes a business takeover of American
politics, particularly through deregulation. Look at Newt Gingrich - his
shift from a moderate to a conservative had to do with this wire
company which bankrolled him and which didn't want regulations in his
district. So there are clearly important economic elite interests behind
the new right. Nevertheless, I don't think it would have its popularity
without the support of real sections of the American electorate that are
not elite sections, for example the fundamentalist Christian right and all
the people who are anxious about race. Those people give a kind of
popular base to this movement which McCarthyism didn't have.
AA: So is the new right a populist movement?
MR: No, because populism was something else entirely. There's always been
a rhetoric in American politics of populism, broadly understood, because
that's the only way American politics can work - everyone's calling on
'the people'. But late nineteenth century Populism was an economic
movement against the ruling elites and the new right is precisely not
that. The new right deflects people's economic anxieties onto targets affirmative action is blamed, illegal immigrants are blamed but they are
not the problem. Populism, which focused upon the economic troubles
of the people, and on the corporations, is the opposite of the new right
strategies.
AA: In the final chapter of Political Change in California, there's a very real
sense in which you predicted what would happen in the 1980s. Orange
County bigotry, prejudice and fundamentalism are analysed with great
prescience. And you say quite explicitly that, having thrown up the
governor of the nation's largest state, it's time to take 'the symbolic
political universe of southern California seriously' .
MR: We stopped that book with Reagan's election to the governorship in
1966, and after that southern California took over American politics.
That means a couple of things. It means Nixon and then Reagan as
Presidents. It means the gun belt. It means Hollywood and the
predominance of symbolic politics and images. It also means the
particular politics of the Sixties in California - Reagan was elected
targeting the student movement and the civil rights movement. That
was the beginning of the counter-revolution that took over American
politics. It was derailed with Watergate and the loss in Vietnam but
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came back again with Reagan. We are still living in the counterrevolution from the Sixties and it's more intense than ever now.
AA: Let's look at symbolic politics more closely because that's an interesting
aspect of your work that has been important to you for some time.
There's the symbolic world of southern California revolving around, in
part, privatized suburbia and a somewhat idealized family. Much later in
your study of Reagan almost everything becomes symbolic Baudrillard's simulacrum has triumphed, except you still believe there is
a difference between image and reality. Isn't there a sense in which
symbolic politics and image politics have taken over, first in California
and then America as a whole, during the last twenty or thirty years?
MR: Image, yes but it is important to see what the central images are - family
and race. First, the family - it's vital to see the central importance of the
institution of the family which came under attack in the Sixties from the
youth revolt before it came under attack from feminism. The whole race
question was understood to be a threat to the family - fears of
intermarriage and so on. So, even though the term wasn't used at the
time, 'traditional family values' became a rallying cry of a whole set of
forces opposed to what was going on in the Sixties. The kinds of issues
which arise in the family - intimate, personal issues, issues of ways of
life and personal relations - became political. The family became a locus
of politics and that takes you into the terrain of symbolic politics. This
began to happen in the Sixties when we were coming off from the New
Deal period in which American politics was organized around socioeconomic interests. This was, it turned out (in my opinion), atypical. I
grew up with it, I assumed that's the way it always was, I started doing
a type of interest group or class analysis originally and so on. But by the
middle of the Sixties it became clear that we had a war in Vietnam
which was inexplicable in terms of economic interests, except for the
interests of the military industrial complex. You were really seeing antiCommunism as ideology plus an obsession with American weakness in
symbolic more than material terms. You also had the race question
which had been buried by the New Deal. Once you begin to look at
American history, you find that American politics has been mythdominated. So when I began this work on symbolic politics, I was
actually re-connecting to the history of the United States, recognizing
that the New Deal is the great exception. And we saw the end of the
New Deal order probably with the election of 1968.
AA: You're talking in part about the idea of America, the ideal America that
never really existed in the way it was propagated. Yet how is the New
Deal a great exception?
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MR: The New Deal is a class based phenomenon. For the first time in
America you have a welfare state, you have mass organization of trade
unions, you have wage and hour laws, you have public works, you have
something which looks a little more like the ways western industrial
democracies operate, particularly in terms of class politics and the
welfare state. It's quite an exception. Historically, America is founded
upon some vision of what you call an ideal America which people now
are beginning to talk about as whiteness. Whiteness as this elevated,
abstract, disembodied thing which is defining itself in relation to the
major factors which have formed the United States historically and
mythologically, namely the dispossession of Indians and the enslavement of blacks. This process forms the basis of our major national myths
and forms of culture, the frontier myth and blackface minstrelsy, which
have dominated American culture and politics from the beginning.
These myths were in abeyance in a certain kind of way during the New
Deal but they have come back powerfully now.
AA: These myths involve a forgetting of history, a reinvention of history, so
was there anything during the New Deal which 'remembered'?
MR: There was a lot of New Deal attention to the 'real' America which had to
do with ordinary people and their problems - in profound ways, like
Agee's Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, or in superficial ways like the book
and the movie Grapes of Wrath. There was a kind of populist moment to
the New Deal which wanted to think of itself as rooted in an American
past (take Woody Guthrie, WPA art) there was a celebration of a certain
sort of American history which included quite a deal of sympathy for the
Indians (look at the work of The Bureau ofIndian Affairs). There was a
lot of effort to get in touch with rather decent things in ordinary
American life. Yet despite this, Roosevelt effectively buried the question
of race. He wouldn't support an anti-lynching bill. Under white
supremacist southern pressure he exempted agricultural and domestic
workers from Social Security. There was a kind of burying of the issue of
race in black-white and Indian-white relations and that was the
condition for a shift from race to class. In the Sixties those things were
remembered through the civil rights movement and because of the
Vietnam war which led people to rethink the history of the United
States as an imperial history. Once those things were remembered, it
wasn't necessarily good for American politics because the counterrevolution was stronger than the revolution. There was too much
unwillingness to repudiate that whole history and so there became a
kind of nationalist identification with it, with white supremacy and
American expansion. So you have the phenomenon now where ninety
nine senators vote against the new standards for American history in
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high school (standards set by a panel of perfectly reasonable, respectable
historians) because what the panel thought high school students ought
to know involved a demythologizing of the American past.
AA: I want to talk a bit more about the symbolic politics of the family
because it's become increasingly interesting in terms of American
historiography and to some degree political science. The symbolic
politics of the family was crucial to the right, old and new, yet the family
has also found favor amongst leftist or left-liberal critics - Christopher
Lasch, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Michael Lerner, Jackson Lears. Arguably,
they speak good sense about the family (as against the bad sense of the
new right) but, given that you are highly critical of pro-family rhetoric,
what's your position?
MR: I think the invocation of the family in politics tends to be reactionary
and mystifying. The reason for that is that the invocation is nostalgic
and it's patriarchal. I think that's precisely when you start worrying
about values and people having the right values - and you're also
worrying about authority - you're forgetting crucial problems,
particularly concerning political economy.
The Moynihan report on the Negro family is a classic example of this.
Right in the middle of the civil rights movement, you have massive
unemployment in the ghetto, you have severe racial segregation, so you
might think that you want to focus on those matters of political
economy if you want to do something about the ghetto. Instead
Moynihan focuses on the Negro family and the problem with that family
is seen to be matriarchy. Young black men, the report argues, need a
patriarchal structure and that's the army. Moynihan himself is one of
eleven Democratic senators to continue to support welfare as an
entitlement for the children of unwed mothers. A whole part of the New
Deal order is being repealed as we speak and Moynihan is one of those
people against that repeal. He still thinks that if children are born out of
wedlock they are entitled to be taken care of in some way. But his
discourse is importantly responsible for why they are not being taken
care of right now and that is because the problem of the inner-city is
seen to be a family failure instead of a problem of political economy. So,
usually the invocation of the family has to do with an anxiety about
fathers not being in control (as with Moynihan). And that anxiety rarely
has good political consequences. I make an analysis of the psychological
and symbolic core of politics in order to try and shift the discourse in the
direction of political economy.
AA: But there is a political economy of family life.
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MR: Sure there is. There's a problem with the feminization of poverty - that's
the problem we should be talking about, not family values.
AA: While in the world of the family, it seems appropriate to ask a question
about fathers in general and your father in particular. The theme of
fathers and sons recurs in your work since the early 1970s. Your book
on Jackson was entitled Fathers and Children and you think it important in
Freudian terms that jackson's father died before Andrew was born.
Later, you stress the fact that Ronald Reagan needed to be free of his
father and in tum was not a real father himself. Filmmaker D.W. Griffith
couldn't be free of his father to the point where he died of drink (just as
his father had) and he thus 'entered his father's dead body'. The book on
Melville was dedicated to your father, a textile workers' organizer
(Melville'S father was a cloth importer). The links or lack of links
between fathers and sons seem to be highly significant in your work.
What do you make of this observation of mine in both personal and
political terms?
MR: My father was a textile workers' organizer, a labour leader and I was very
much under his influence. My father, because his union failed, remained
a lot more radical than many of his friends whose unions hadn't yet
failed (the auto workers, steelworkers, and so on). The new left in its
early years was basically a movement of people like me (although I was a
little older than that generation), people whose fathers were liberal and
there was a rebellion against a kind of liberal politics that didn't seem to
be engaged in a radical way any more. So I think there is a perfectly
legitimate student revolt which is also a family revolt and we did in the
Sixties begin to focus upon generational questions. That partly explains
my shift away from a social democratic way of interpreting things to a
more symbolic cultural way of interpreting things - that was, to some
degree, a generational rebellion. Yet I remained very close to my father.
He wasn't crazy about the Jackson book because it was too
psychoanalytic for him (and maybe because of the theme of patriarchal
oppression) but he loved having my Melville book dedicated to him. He
also became radicalized himself again in the Sixties. A lot of old left
people became neoconservatives then but my father did not, so I was
lucky in that respect. He remained connected to me and my work and we
shared this world. That's the personal part. I became fascinated, partly
for personal reasons, by the efforts of important American political and
cultural figures to establish their own identity against some kind of
either failed or too powerful paternal presence. So I began to analyze
American politics that way, with Jackson, with Melville, with Griffith
and with Reagan.

62

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES

AA.: What about Clinton?

I

MR: Well you could do something like that with Clinton but Clinton to me is
a rather pathetic and not very interesting figure who is responsible for a
lot of the politics under which we're now living by his own unwillingness to be confrontational. Everyone says 'he's the son of an
alcoholic' and he shares that with Reagan. But Reagan had a very clear
delusional political vision which he managed to impose on the country,
while Clinton has none and thus creates the space for all the energy to
come from the right, even if that ends up benefiting him politically as
the moderate voice against the demons he's helped unleash. I guess I'm
disgusted with Clinton but also not very interested in him. I have tended
to try to work on people who had a powerful impact, either political or
literary, in their own right which is certainly true of Jackson in relation
to Indian removal, certainly true of Melville the great American novelist,
and certainly of Griffith who made the most important early films. I'm
criticized by some people for focusing upon great historic moments,
transformative moments and the people who made them. If you don't
come of age in a transformative period, say if you come of age in the
Seventies or Eighties, you might want to feel there's a lot more room for
maneuver and you don't have to focus on the great heroic failures. But
my generation did come of age during a transformative period, so that's
what I do.
AA.: There's something almost refreshingly 'politically incorrect' about the

I

Freudian analysis in the Jackson book. I gather a new introduction
almost apologizes for this patriarchal discourse.

I.

I

MR: No, not really. What I say in that new introduction is that I published
my book in almost exactly the same year as Dorothy Dinnerstein
published The Mermaid and the Minotaur and Nancy Chodorow published
The Reproduction of Mothering. I was interested not only in the topic of
fathers and sons but also in the anxieties that are recreated later in life
but originally come from early childhood relations with the mother and
a kind of misogyny that comes out of a fear of dependence on women.
That was a big part of my Jackson book, even though it also tended to
reflect a psychoanalytic orthodoxy which was being undermined. There
was a psychoanalytic discourse taking hold which is really about the
early mother, male anxieties in relation to women and I think of myself
in that tradition which goes back to Melanie Klein more than Freud. I
see myself as a critic of Freudian patriarchalism because Freud was
interested in resurrecting the patriarchal father and I'm interested in
criticizing that from what I'd like to think of as a more feminist position.
Not as a 'male feminist', which is a bad faith position to occupy, but as a

I

AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES

63

supporter of feminism. I think my later work is much less dogmatically
or mechanically Freudian and Kleinian than the Jackson book, but I've
hardly abandoned a psychoanalytic orientation. The Jackson book has
many virtues but its unreconstructed psychological liberationism is a
product of the late 1960s and early 1970s, what Lenin would call the
'infantile disorder' of the times.
AA: But at the very least you seem to be saying that a world without fathers
is no utopia.
MR: I see, that's interesting. Some people have said that in taking the
position that there's a problem in male dependence upon the early
mother, I must believe that the solution to that problem ought to be
strong fathers, so I sound exactly like Daniel Patrick Moynihan. I don't
want to sound like him but there are some things in the Jackson book
which have been interpreted that way. I'm very critical of the position
that patriarchal claims - in slavery, in Indian relations, in traditional
family values - invoke a flawed, punitive father to get the fantasized allpowerful mother under control. Patriarchal ideology is a defence against
anxieties about women that should be dealt with in a different way,
namely by creating sexual equality. Let's not, however, equate sexual
equality with getting rid of fathers.
AA: Some socialist feminist historians have rejected the term patriarchy as
being too fixed, immutable, ahistorical. You still use the term.
MR: You have to specify what you mean. Within American culture there has
been a recurrent anxiety about the weakness of paternal authority and
there have been constant efforts to cement its role. You can see this in
Indian relations, slave relations, family relations. There are, of course,
changes over time and within different arenas, and they have to be
specified.
AA: You have been one of the more important supporters of the American
exceptionalism thesis. I'm thinking particularly about your stress on
American liberalism (a very American liberalism), the centrality of race
over class for most of American history. Yours isn't a celebratory variety
of American exceptionalism (unlike Daniel Boorstin), nonetheless all
such exceptionalist doctrines have come in for a battering in recent
times. What would you say about the American exceptionalism thesis
now?
MR: My intellectual father was Louis Hartz. I am just about the only radical
who counts Louis Hartz as an important authority. If you understand
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Hartz's development you will be able to understand my position. Hanz
started as a Marxist but when he abandoned that position he retained
one crucial feature of it which was the notion that America, as he put it
later, was a fragment society coming out of the liberal fragment. So the
absence of a hereditary aristocracy and monarchy and the absence of
socialism, the sweep of a certain kind of propertied liberal individualism
was peculiar to the United States among western industrial societies,
and among other fragments which spun out of Europe in the period of
settlement. Another word for fragment societies is settler societies.
Hartz began to think about settler societies and as the Sixties started he
began to think about race. That's exactly the same evolution that I went
through. I started out with a focus upon the peculiar sway of a
propertied liberal individualism in the United States. Then I began to
realize that this intersects with race, and it intersects with race because
the United States was a settler society, formed at the origins of the
capitalist world system - formed out of the triangular trade, out of the
meeting point of Africa, the New World and Europe.
There are differences with other settler societies and differences with
Europe. What is distinctive about the United States is that it was a
bourgeois society built upon Indian land, with slave labour, which then
takes this history and turns it into myth. That is to say it makes the
dispossession of Indians and the process of that dispossession one of its
central myths - the frontier myth, Daniel Boone, Leatherstocking, the
western movie (everybody knows that's been America's contribution to
world culture). Then there was slavery, and blackface minstrelsy, which
was associated with Jacksonian democracy, was the first and most
popular form of mass culture in the world - miming the expropriation of
blacks by putting on blackface and black voice. So the other major myth
has to do with white and black and I argue in my new book that white
over black in the form of black over white dominates the crucial
moments in American motion picture history - Uncle Tom's Cabin, Birth of
a Nation, The Jazz Singer (the first talking picture which is also the
immigrant blackface Americanization story), and then Gone With the
Wind (the first blockbuster movie). In other words, making culture out
of the subjugation of peoples of colour is what is distinctive about
American culture and it's also what characterizes American politics. I
see that as exceptionalist.
AA: One thing you have written about extensively which brings American
exceptional ism to the surface is the year 1848. Within America you have
racial domination, murder, exploitation, the thrust towards the frontier,
manifest destiny, imperialism. Is it possible that this American 1848 was
more significant than the European 1848?
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MR: I think that's true because the European 1848 was a failure. Of course, if
you follow Lukacs then there were very important consequences
including the creation of cultural modernism and of mass working class
parties in the latter part of the century but it is still the case that the
1848 liberal nationalist revolutions failed. Whereas the American 1848
succeeded. What I argue is that exactly parallel to the 1848 revolutions
in Europe is the liberal expansionist moment in America (involving
racial expansionism rather than a struggle against aristocracy, although
Tocqueville does call the Indians the lords of the forest). The American
1848, the Mexican War, does founder on the conflict over slavery
between the slave states and the free states just as the European 1848
foundered due to class conflict. But out of the American 1848 you get a
civil war - this is really the engine of American history in the mid 19th
century in a way that the consequences of 1848 are not in Europe. My
main point is that in America it's expansion and it's race (Indians and
blacks), in Europe it's much more about class.
AA: It seems like a bit of a jump from 1848 to 1968, but ...
MR: It's the same thing, exactly the same. '68 is an international phenomenon like 1848, another failed utopian moment, but in the United
States it's again tied up with these two fundamental issues - race (civil
rights, black power, the urban uprising) and expansionism (the war in
Vietnam, which was an extension of the conquest of Indians. Vietnam
was 'Indian country'). So the specificity of ' 68 in America was, once
again, Indians and blacks.

~..

AA: Here in Berkeley, by 1968 the radicals dreamed of revolution (even if
just in one town or one street. Berkeley was seen as an island of
socialism, there was a Telegraph Avenue Liberation Front). The dreams
came unstuck soon after People's Park but I sense you don't think, as so
many now do, that the left was wrong to dream. And you've been in
Berkeley since 1963 and Berkeley has always been seen as different from
America, itself exceptional. Perhaps you would like to reflect upon that
because it again brings up personal and political dimensions.
MR: What's different about Berkeley? The Free Speech Movement was produced by people who come back from Mississippi Freedom Summer (so
there's the race or civil rights connection) and it culminated in People's
Park which was explicitly understood as a protest against the taking of
communal land (in a way which may seem a little quaint today but at
the time seemed in the tradition of the Indians). Personally, if I'd stayed
in the east I would have been much more under the sway of the
established eastern institutions and intellectuals, and the Cold War
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discourse which never penetrated northern California to the same
degree. So there was more freedom here which enabled things to happen
and I identified closely with what was happening. I was very influenced
by students I worked with in that period (one of whom was leading
Berkeley radical Frank Bardacke), and also by a group of political
theorists here (Sheldon Wolin, John Schaar and Norman Jacobson) who
were emancipated from Cold War ways of thinking. So it was a
tremendous liberation to get out of Harvard and Chicago (although
Chicago was very stimulating) and to be here as the student movement
took off. I went from a quiescent and stultifying Harvard in the Fifties,
to a more intellectually and also politically exciting Chicago in the late
Fifties and early Sixties but it was really a break to come to Berkeley.
AA: Finally, as Clinton'S 'liberalism' succumbs to new right ideology, as the
welfare state is eroded on a daily basis, as locally the Regents of the
University of California have abolished affirmative action and there's
been talk of big rises in fees, as Eugene Genovese has become Dinesh
D'Souza's ad man, is there anything left to dream about?
MR: The Genovese thing is very interesting because he is so authoritarian. He
used to be a Stalinist defender of the slave ruling class and now he's an
anti-Stalinist defender of the slave ruling class. He is an important
scholar and a lot of his work is very impressive. But the core driving
motivation of Genovese is patriarchal authoritarianism. Genovese is one
of a number of people - some are more strident, some are more liberal who, because they can't let go of this idea of an authoritarian centre
which is made up of white men, are extremely anxious about women
and people of color speaking for themselves and think that if only they
stopped speaking for themselves we could have ... well, the dream varies
... the good family, the welfare state, class politics, and so on. The
position which wishes that the fractures in a white male-dominated
coalition would go away, that white men would once again be the
universal class, is very reactionary.
So, what to dream of now? Some people think that we should dream of
the new immigration plus feminism because the patriarchal centre can't
withstand the pressure from those social forces. Out of this ferment, it is
hoped, something could come, comparable historically to the labor and
civil rights movements. At the moment we have a severe black-white
divide and these people want to transcend that by embracing something
more 'multicultural'. But the problem, as I argue in my latest book, is
that it is precisely at times of mass immigration that you get an
increasing focus on black and white, a racializing of politics (the
campaign against affirmative action is a battle to racialize politics not to

I~

I'
I

I.•

AUSTRALASlANJOURNAL OF AMERICAN STUDIES

67

remove race as a category) in order to incorporate the immigrants into
the dominant society, which is done by using blackface as a transitional
mode toward becoming white. So, historically, the immigrants enter the
American racial divide, they play with it and they cross over to the white
side. There' 5 this diabolical link between mass immigration which ought
to pluralize America and a racial divide which binarizes it and I think
we're having that reproduced again. The black-white divide is becoming
fundamental as a way of moving some new immigrants onto the white
side, demonizing others as inferior (racially inferior or culturally
inferior). Somehow we have to break out of it but I don't have a
program. I do think we need to go back to class politics or, if you want
to do it in less Marxist terms, to a public opposed to the plutocrats who
are capitalizing on the racial divide. Privatization, in which economic
and familial meanings are linked, is the thing to oppose. But at the same
time it does seem to me that you aren't going to have a class or public
politics as long as people are so obsessed with the danger of those dark
peoples, and those women, and those queers. As long as you have that
kind of fear it's always going to be mobilized against some kind of class
alliance. Race and sex are the trump card in this country until somehow
they are dealt with. You can't just wish that they would go away.

NOTES
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